It is documented that technical analysis is a highly pervasive activity among stock traders and security analysts in China. This paper uses eight years' data on daily stock prices and trading volume of thirty-nine companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to examine the usefulness of technical analysis. Very weak evidence in support of return predictability is generated either by considering returns alone or by the use of volume in conjunction with returns. The results not only cast doubt on the ability of technical analysis to predict future price movements in China's stock markets, but also challenge the views of market inefficiency for China that are based on aggregate market data rather than individual company data.
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Introduction
In China's stock markets, technical analysis is a more pervasive activity not only than fundamental analysis, but also than in other nations' stock markets. Various media are congested with comments on, and predictions of, the future price movements for the market as a whole and for individual stocks. Nearly every evening and in every place, radio and television programs invite chartists and technical analysts to answer questions from individual stock investors and even give them advice on which stock to buy or sell. These security analysts, as well as many other stock commentators and newsletter writers, base their recommendations on technical analysis.
For the past ten years or so, stock manipulation has been a prevalent phenomenon in China, and many investors have endeavoured to follow a handful of powerful stock manipulators. With such manipulators dominant in the market, fundamental analysis of listed companies seems to become less appealing than technical analysis. Large institutional investors use technical charts as an important means to guide the changing directions of stock prices and to influence indirectly other investors'
actions. Medium and small institutional investors take the charted trends of markets as the major grounds on which to form their decisions. And scattered individual investors are even keener to trace stock manipulators through technical analysis, in a hope that they can imitate their actions beneficially.
More than 90% of stock investors in China are scattered individuals. Indeed it is not possible for the majority of individuals to undertake thorough investigations and professional financial analyses of every listed company's fundamentals in order to judge on the worthiness of investment and/or speculation in their shares. They can only rely on some simple tools of technical analysis, utilising available historical statistics such as demand and supply of stocks, price movements and trading volume, as well as some technical trading rules. Nowadays, China's stock markets are also equipped with information technology in the internet era; and what individual investors need to do seems just to switch on a computer, take a look at historical and recent trends of major market indicators, and make reference to some technical trading rules. Its simplicity and clearness make technical analysis so popular among China's individual stock traders.
But is technical analysis of as much value as appropriate to its popularity in believe that "everything in markets could be fake but not the volume of trading".
However, taking advantage of such belief, some stock manipulators are able to set up "technical traps" to defraud small and individual investors of their funds. Frequent and abrupt policy changes also cause the failure of technical analysis, as "big government, small market" still characterises China's stock markets. Ye (2002) reviews the major historical troughs, and finds that they have never been the ones implied by technical analysis but the ones induced by policy changes (hence named as "policy troughs" by the author).
Whatever tools and rules technical analysis employs, one of the underlying assumptions is that the prices for individual stocks and the overall value of the market tend to move in trends; that is, price adjustments are slow. For this assumption to hold, the market should be either afflicted with a thin trading problem or characterised by informational inefficiency or both. Informational inefficiency implies that current prices are not fully revealing about the fundamental value of the asset as reflected in past prices and volume. Although Ye (2002) questions the usefulness of technical analysis in China, he fails to probe into the essential issue of whether price adjustments are slow and the underlying reasons. In this paper, we approach the above-posed question by considering this issue and the underlying reasons.
As aforementioned, the question of whether technical analysis is of value is closely related to the question of whether the market is weak-form inefficient. In an efficient market, investors are homogeneous in their accesses to information and technical analysis has no role to play (Brown and Jennings, 1989 ). An inefficient market implies that investors are heterogeneously informed, and so technical analysis is of certain value (Blume et al, 1994) . Previous studies on weak-form efficiency of China's stock markets have yielded mixed results. Evidence that supports the weak-form efficient market hypothesis (EMH) for China is provided in Liu, Song, and Romilly (1997) , Laurence, Cai and Qian (1997) , and Long, Payne, and Feng (1999) . Contrary to this, Mookerjee and Yu (1999) , among others, conclude that there are significant inefficiencies present on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Li (2003a and 2003b) The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we conduct a preliminary analysis of return predictability without considering the role of volume.
Section 3 extends the analysis to incorporate volume as well as returns. This is followed by section 4 where conclusions are offered.
A preliminary analysis of return predictability
Return predictability is often used to gauge the usefulness of technical analysis, and it may arise from two sources: market illiquidity and market inefficiency. Market illiquidity refers to the situation that stocks are traded infrequently. This thin trading problem, if serious, would cause significant autocorrelation in return series, making current returns predictable based on past returns. Market inefficiency refers to the situation that current prices do not fully reflect the information contained in past prices, and will also, as is well known, induce autocorrelation in return series. To distinguish clearly between the two in later discussion, we term the predictability due to market illiquidity "spurious predictability", and the predictability caused by market inefficiency "genuine predictability".
Many emerging markets have been found to be characterised by both thin trading and inefficiency. It is possible that stocks do not trade at some consecutive intervals. In China, those non-trading intervals are largely due to public holidays, no traders or very few traders for the stock, trading halted by the authorities for whatever reasons, and so on. Non-trading intervals are not a unique feature of emerging markets;
developed equity markets also experience them. Whether a serious thin trading problem would result depends on how frequent non-trading intervals occur and how long they are. The presence of a serious thin trading problem makes it difficult to isolate spurious predictability from genuine predictability. One solution to this problem proposed by Miller et al (1994) is to use adjusted return series wherein the impact of thin trading may be removed (to be discussed in more details later). However, this method is likely to take away genuine predictability as well. So, we need to see how serious the thin trading problem is in the Chinese stock markets, and which return series, unadjusted or adjusted or both, should be used in our analysis. In what follows, we undertake some statistical tests for this purpose.
We use daily closing stock price indexes of thirty-nine companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and the aggregate SZSE index, to generate thirty- The data were obtained from Datastream.
To test for the significance of return predictability (i.e., α 1 ), the following AR (1) model is estimated for each of the thirty-nine companies:
where r t could be unadjusted returns or adjusted returns. Unadjusted returns are computed straightaway by differencing logarithmic prices: r t = ln(p t ) -ln(p t-1 ). The computation of adjusted returns involves estimating recursively the model
to obtain the estimates of 1t α and t u , and then using the equation
Replacing r t with adj t r in equation (1), one can test the significance of α 1 for adjusted returns. Treating α 1t in equation (2) as time varying is justified by Antoniou et al (1997) on the ground that, whereas the non-trading adjustment process is constant for highly liquid developed markets, this may not be the case for emerging markets. In estimating equation (2), we apply the Kalman filter algorithm, assuming that α 0t and α 1t follow a random walk process (i.e., α it = α it-1 + ξ t with i = 0, 1) . Antoniou et al (1997) propose such a method of assessing the seriousness of the thin trading problem. This is practically implemented by forming portfolios on the basis of the trading volume of each stock. We computed the monthly trading volumes of the four stocks over the entire sample period. The most liquid stock is incorporated into portfolio 1, the second most liquid into portfolio 2, and so on. There are totally four portfolios so formed, and they can be ranked from the most actively traded to the least actively traded. Then four series of portfolio unadjusted returns are computed to generate their daily observations. Since the trading activeness of each stock as measured by its monthly trading volume varies from month to month, the stock that constitutes a portfolio shifts among stocks #1, #23, #36 and #38 from month to month.
Working with portfolio unadjusted returns, we can carry out reasoning along the following line. If spurious predictability is dominant or if thin trading is serious enough to become a cause of autocorrelation in (unadjusted) return series, then portfolios with the lower levels of volume will demonstrate a more significant autocorrelation coefficient α 1 than portfolios with the higher levels of volume. This is found by Antoniou et al (1997) , and can be used as a ground on which to base our judgement.
From the test results for unadjusted portfolio returns as reported in Table 2 (under "Absolute volume"), it can be seen that the most liquid portfolio 1 has its estimated autocorrelation coefficients α 1 significant at the 10% level, while less liquid portfolios 2, 3 and 4 have α 1 's not significant at all. This suggests that there is no evidence of thin trading impacting on the degree of predictability of the unadjusted returns on the four stocks. Thus, the return predictability of stock #1, #23, #36 or #38 is due only to market inefficiency, not thin trading. But whatever causes their return predictability, one thing for certain is that technical analysis is useful for traders who are interested in trading these four stocks, even if it is only based on return data. So, these four companies will be excluded from our further analysis below.
A further analysis on volume's role in predicting returns
We knew from Table 1 that thirty-five out of thirty-nine stocks are not predictable in terms of their returns. This rules out the existence of a serious thin trading problem, and so their unadjusted returns can be used in drawing correct inferences regarding the value of technical analysis. But does this also rule out the possibility of market inefficiency?
Or can we just stop here to conclude that technical analysis is of no value for the thirtyfive stocks? The answer is no. Antoniou et al (1997) show that seemingly efficient returns may still demonstrate predictability after taking account of the role of trading volume. In the previous section, the variable volume was used to form portfolios of those four stocks only, and the tests on return predictability for all thirty-nine stocks did not consider the role of volume or the possible additional information contained in volume. Thus, at this point we can only say that the thirty-five individual stock returns are "seemingly" efficient. Whether "seeming" efficiency will turn out to become "genuine" efficiency is what we want to find out in this section.
To incorporate trading volume into technical analysis on price data is to see whether trading volume contains some information relating to the fundamentals of companies that prices do not. If the answer is positive, then the conclusion of market efficiency drawn from the analysis only on price data needs to be reconsidered or even reversed. Following Antoniou et al (1997) , we estimated r t = α 0 + α 1 r t-1 + βr mt + ε t
for the thirty-five stock returns both unadjusted and adjusted, with r mt denoting market returns on the SZSE stock index. Although the use of unadjusted returns on the thirtyfive stocks was already justified in the previous section, it is still of interest to see whether the results would be considerably different if adjusted returns were used instead.
The estimation of equation (4) The estimation results are reported in Table 3 . Except companies #7 and #20, the other thirty-three stocks exhibit unpredictability of unadjusted returns. When adjusted returns are used, three companies (#14, #21 and #39) end up with their stock returns becoming predictable, but the others do not. Comparing Table 3 with Table 1 where all the same thirty-five stocks displayed no return predictability, it is evident that incorporating trading volumes into technical analysis on returns increases predictability only slightly. This suggests that, on the individual stock level, technical analysis of both volume and return data is not of much value.
Next, we check to see if the above conclusions hold on the portfolio level. Seven portfolios are formed on the basis of monthly trading volumes, each having five stocks weighted according to the ratios of their individual volumes to their total volume of trading. Again these seven portfolios are ranked from the most liquid (portfolio 1) to the least liquid (portfolio 7). However, since the thin trading problem is absent for the thirty-five stocks, we expect the degree of return predictability after taking volume into account to be similar across the portfolios. That is, if volume does not help predict the majority of stock returns, the no-predictability result should also apply to all portfolios comprising these stocks, even if the seven portfolios have different levels of trading volume. The columns under "Absolute volume" in Tables 5 and 6 verify our conjecture.
Although the values of α 1 do change from one portfolio to another, they are all insignificant even at the 10% level, the same for unadjusted and adjusted returns. In other words, at the 10% significance level, none of the seven portfolios exhibit predictability. This provides a ground for arguing that volume does not add more information to prices in predicting portfolio returns.
Two extensions to the work reported above were also made. The first extension is that we tried various lags of volume (and of differenced volume) and returns as instruments for lag 1 of returns when estimating equation (4). The results remain basically similar, in terms of both individual stocks and portfolios, to those with lag 1 of volume and lag 2 of returns as the instrument variables. That is, the majority of stock returns and all portfolio returns are still unpredictable.
As a second extension, we also used relative volume instead of absolute volume and went through the entire process of analysis. The reasons why we also wanted to consider relative volume are as follows. 1994 , in sharp contrast with the case of absolute volume. One important implication of using relative volume is that the seven portfolios formed on the basis of relative trading volume will certainly change their constituent stocks. The question is: will such changes affect our results considerably and qualitatively?
The answer seems to be negative. Referring back to Tables 2, 3 and 4, one can see that there is little difference between the results based on absolute volume and on relative volume. For instance, in Table 2 , only portfolio 1 exhibits different predictability between absolute and relative volumes but at only the 10% significance level, and other portfolios do not at all. Tables 3 and 4 reveal that the overwhelming 2 The company size used in this paper is measured by the total number of tradable shares of a particular company. It should be noticed that not all shares but only a proportion of them issued by a state-owned or mainly state-owned company are allowed to be traded or to be put in circulation. (Fu et al, 1999) .
evidence of no predictability does not change between absolute and relative volumes, and this is true for both cases of unadjusted and adjusted returns. What changes is only that predictability shifts from some to other stocks. A close inspection of Tables 5 and 6 indicates that no difference at all exists between the results based on the two types of volume in terms of predictability.
The two extensions confirm that the results reported in this section are robust.
That is, most of the thirty-five stock returns and all the seven portfolio returns turn out to be genuinely efficient, after considering the possible role of volume.
Conclusion
Technical analysis is of value when the market is inefficient and/or is characterised by thin trading, as under these two circumstances returns are predictable based on either stock price movements or corresponding volume movements or both. Thus the existence of return predictability, whether spurious or genuine, justifies the use of technical analysis. Bearing this in mind, we have explored various possibilities, examining the problems of thin trading and inefficiency, using unadjusted and adjusted returns, considering past volume in conjunction with past returns, trying absolute and relative volume data, and estimating the appropriate model with different instrument variables, in order to dig out the maximum possible value of technical analysis in China's stock markets. However, the evidence generated is very weak in supporting both spurious and genuine predictability of returns. It can now be argued that volume does not contain additional information omitted by prices for the majority of the thirtynine listed companies in China's SZSE market. This casts doubt on the practical usefulness of technical analysis for China's stock traders, and reveals the inconformity between its value and popularity in the nation.
On the theoretical level, our results based on individual company data suggest that China's stock markets are characterised by a certain degree of weak-form efficiency, and non-trading intervals do not pose a serious problem of thin trading.
These findings are quite surprising, as they challenge those of some previous studies that employ aggregate stock price indexes. Our results also run counter to those of a similar study on emerging markets by Antoniou et al (1997) . The case of China shows that emerging markets are not always places where traders or technical analysts can and will learn more about the future pattern of returns by actively using volume in conjunction with returns than those who only watch price movements. White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-ratios are used for unadjusted returns while conventional t-ratios are used for adjusted returns. 
White, H. (1980
